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COMMENTS
adopted which will provide for separate trials of the general plea
of not guilty and the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the
time of the crime. Perhaps the California procedure affords the
best solution; perhaps an even better solution can be found. An-
other improvement would be to have a special sanity board, similar
to that of Massachusetts, to examine into the sanity of accused
persons who raise or may be expected to raise the plea of insanity.
EDWIN C. SCHILLING, JR.
JURIDICAL BASIS OF PRINCIPAL- THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA UNDISCLOSED
AGENCY CASES
The recent case of Sentell v. Richardson' presented our supreme
court with an excellent opportunity to clarify the Louisiana approach
to that situation where one person performs a juridical act for
another. Under the terms of the contract in that case, plaintiff ad-
vanced to defendant the purchase price of certain stock which the
latter was to have reissued in his own name without revealing the
fact that he was acting for plaintiff. Defendant was then obliged to
endorse and deliver the stock to plaintiff. After completing nego-
tiations to purchase it from the owners, however, defendant notified
plaintiff of his withdrawal from the contract and sold the stock for
himself to a third person. One of the questions in the case was
whether or not the contract was one of agency. Plaintiff claimed that
defendant was his agent when negotiating for the stock, and as such
was legally unable to purchase it for himself. Defendant countered
with the proposition that this was no contract of agency since it did
not come within the definition of Mandate in Article 2985 of the
Civil Code,' which required that the mandatary act in his princi-
pal's name. Conceding that there was no representation, the court
nevertheless found that the relation was one of mandate, stating that
representation was not essential to mandate: "Our opinion is that
the words 'and in his name' are not essential to the definition of a
procuration or power of attorney, as defined in Article 2985 of the
Civil Code. If those words were essential to the definition there
1. 211 La. 288, 29 So. (2d) 852 (1947).
2. "A mandate, procuration or letter of attorney is an act by which one




could be no such thing as a procuration or power of attorney to buy
property for an undisclosed principal."'
Was the method employed by the supreme court a satisfactory
approach to the problem? A logical step in the pursuit of a possible
answer to this question would be a brief consideration of the general
manner in which the French and common law treat the subject of
"Agency."
FRENCH AGENCY CONCEPTS
Mandat, or representative agency, is specifically provided for in
the French Civil Code.4 The French Commercial Code sanctions
the contract of commission,' or non-representative agency, in com-
mercial matters, and French jurisprudence and doctrine have recog-
nized the contract of prt~e-nom, which is no more than commission
transferred to the civil law.6 While in mandat' liability between
principal and third party is recognized, the opposite is true in pr'te-
nom and commission.' Here we see the result of the French em-
phasis upon the requirement that there be representation before a
principal, rather than his agent, may be held liable by a third person.
Thus, in French law, the question of the liability of principal and
third party is resolved into one of whether or not there was rep-
resentation.
COMMON LAW AGENCY CONCEPTS
Omitting discussion of the various definitions' of "agency"
proper, for purposes of this comment, the common law agency sit-
uations may be classified as (1) agency disclosed with principal
identified, (2) principal undisclosed-either with the fact of agency
3. 211 La. 288, 298, 29 So. (2d) 852, 855.
4. 2 Planiol, Trait6 Elmentaire De Droit Civil (11 ed. 1989) 785, no 2281.
5. Goirand, French Commercial Law and the Practice of the Courts (2 ed.
1898) 155. French Commercial Code, Art. 94.
6. Planiol, loc. cit. supra note 4.
7. Planiol, op. cit. supra note 6, at 795, no 2266.
8. Id. at 797, no 2271: "Los tiors no connaissent, ou sent censs ne connaitro
quo to pr~te-nom: c'est 'lui qui ost tour or6ancior, tui qui est leur dibiteur, lui
qui et propridtairo des bions mis sous son nom. Its ont done to droit do le
poursuivre ot tis peuvent 4tre poursuivis par lui; ot, d'aatre part, its no pouvwnt
poursuivre que mi on 9tro poursuivis quo par lui." Also see note 7, supra.
9. A. L. I., Restatement of Agency, § 1, defined it as "the relationship which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other
so to act."
More terse definition is given by Seavey, The Rationale of Agency (1919)
29 Yale L. J. 859,868: "A consensual relationship in which one (the agent) holds
in trust for and subject to the control of another (the principal) a power to affect
certain legal relations of that other."
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concealed altogether, or with agency disclosed but principal uniden-
tified. The first situation is very similar to the French mandat, with
the rights and duties of principal and agent practically the same. The
second classification is comparable to the prete-nom and commission
situation, since the principal's identity in both is unknown at the
time of the transaction. However, there is one important practical
difference between the two. Under this common law situation,
which we may call "simple agency" for convenience, principal and
third party are permitted to sue each other directly." As previously
noted," no such suit is sanctioned under prete-nom or commission.
Various theories are advanced to rationalize the common law
acceptance of those ideas represented by "simple agency." 2 As to its
historical evolution, we know that not until the seventeenth century
did the common law, largely through the efforts of the chancellor,
begin to accept some of the more advanced ideas of the law mer-
chant on agency.'" For example, although it was originally necessary
to show that the specific contract of agency in question was author-
ized or had been ratified, the court of chancery began to hold a
principal liable for goods supplied to his known agent without re-
quiring this proof. Then it took an additional step and protected
the interests of a principal whose agent acted in his own name.
Eventually this practice was adopted by the law courts.
Mr. Justice Holmes explained the adoption of "simple agency"'
as he did the master's liability for his servant's torts committed with-
in the scope of employment-the fiction of identity, carried down.
from ancient times, by which the slave was viewed as one with his
master.'" Another legal historian condemns this theory, pointing to
the gap of centuries between the two ideas. 5 He proceeds to ex-
pound the proposition that this doctrine came directly, from the
action of debt, which was given by the law of contract to an undis-
closed principal who furnished the quid pro quo on which the debt
was based. This principle was supposed to have been later extended
10. Mississippi Valley Co. v. Abeles, 87 Ark. 374, 112 S. W. 894 (1908);
Humphrey v. Bussey, 99 Fla. 1249, 128 So 841 (1930); Johnson v. Maddock, 119
Fla. 777, 161 So. 842 (1935); Schweyer v. Jones, 152 Mich. 241, 115 N. W. 974(1908); City Trust Co. v. Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. 486, 67 N. E. 62 (1908);
Eckstein v. Caldwell, 61 R. I. 142, 200 Atl. 434 (1938); Waddill v. Sebree,.
88 Va. 1012, 14 S. E. 849 (1892); Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S. E. 137(1924); 2 Mechem on Agency (2 ed. 1914) 1318, § 1731; A. L. I., Restatement of
Agency, 674, § 302.
11. See note 8, supra.
12. Mechem, Outlines of Agency (3 ed. 1923) 304 , § 464.
13. 5 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1927) 297.
14. Select Essays in Anglo-American Law (1907-1909) 390.
15. Walsh, History of Anglo-American Law (2 ed. 1932) 359.
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to all contracts with the view taken that the contract was really
between the undisclosed principal and the third person. It is further
contended that the agent may be liable at the third party's election,
not because he is in fact a party to the contract, but because the agent
is estopped from denying that the contract is his, due to the false
representation that he was the principal. Still another writer declares
that to hold the undisclosed principal liable is consistent with the
theory of obligations enforced in the action of assumpsit, since he is
really the one who caused the third party to act.'"
This doctrine of "simple agency" might be superficially justi-
fied on the basis of public policy. To allow such suit would be
equitable in most cases, and was certainly conducive to the best inter-
ests of commerce. However, these different theories have not been
examined in an attempt to reach an exact conclusion, but rather to
give the reader some idea of the possible reasons for the common
law's recognition that privity of contract is not necessary to allow
suit between an undisclosed principal and a third party. While, in
contrast, the French insist upon representation to render such suit
possible.
LOUISIANA AGENCY CONCEPTS
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, like the French Civil Code,
provides for only one of the agency situations previously discussed,
that of mandate or representative agency. 7 No express reference is
made anywhere in our written law to the performance of a juridical
act by an agent who acts in his own name. As a result, our jurispru-
dence repeatedly has had to justify suit between principal and third
party on some other basis.
The earliest case in point seems to have been that of Williams v.
Winchester in 1828." There, the defendant had employed an agent
to purchase boilers from plaintiff, without revealing defendant's
name. Plaintiff, claimed the purchase price from the defendant, and
the latter contended that he was liable only to the agent. Using
common law terms but citing no authority for its proposition, the
court held that an unknown principal would be liable when discov-
ered, although no inquiry was made by the vendor.
16. Lewis, The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contract (1909)
9 Col. L. Rev. 116.
17. Arts. 2985-3084, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. 7 Mart. (N. S.) 22 (La. 1828).
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In Ballister v. Hamilton9 the opinion was to the effect that
"mere knowledge that there is a principal will not destroy the right
of a party dealing with an agent, and charging him with the balance
due on the transaction, to look to the principal when afterwards
discovered." Again, no reference to Louisiana law is made.
Following this was the case of Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora &
Owners.2" Plaintiff had entered into a written contract with one
Ealer, agreeing to act as pilot of a steamboat for a specified length
of time. Having been dismissed without sufficient cause, he brought
suit against Ealer and one Houston, contending that both were liable
as co-owners. The court found that although Ealer had contracted
in his own name, if it were afterwards discovered that he acted as
agent for Houston, both would be liable.
An Orleans Court of Appeal case 2' in 1913 held that an undis-
closed principal, in a business conducted by an agent in his own
name, was liable for debts incurred by the agent in the course of the
business.
Citing a common law authority, the court in Valmont Service
Station v. Avegno"2 again held an undisclosed principal liable. There
the plaintiff had serviced a truck believing that the agent was its
owner, and sending the demands for payment to him. When the
.account was not paid, plaintiff discovered that defendant was owner
of the truck and the agent was merely manager of his dairy. Citing
Corpus Juris, the court held that "where there is in fact an agency
and the fact is concealed, the person dealing with the agent, may,
upon discovering the principal, proceed against the latter and not
against the agent."
The undisclosed principal brought an action in Childers v.
Police Jury of Parish of Ouachita"3 to recover an amount alleged to
be due his agent under a contract entered into with defendant for
construction of a public road. It was contended that plaintiff had no
right of action since he was not privy to the contract. The decision
was to the contrary, stating that a direct action by an undisclosed
principal is permitted whenever the person contracting with the
agent may not be injured. The opinion in Johnson v. Bisso Towboat
19. 3 La. Ann. 401 (1848).
20. 5 La. Ann. 15 (1850).
21. Grimaldi & Co. v. Joseph Sbisa, 10 Orl. App. 176 (1913).
22. 3 La. App. 335 (1925).
23. 121 So. 248 (La. App. 1928).
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Company24 was to the same effect, holding that when one discovers
that the party with whom he dealt has acied as agent, he may seek
out the principal and hold him liable.
A later Orleans Court of Appeal case2" found that "it is a well-
established rule of general law, that when an agent, on behalf of
his principal, entered into a contract as though for himself, and the
existence of the principal is not disclosed, the contract inures to the
benefit of the principal who may appear and hold the other party
to the contract made by the agent."
Thus, before Sentell v. Richardson, our jurisprudence decided
the issue of liability between principal and third party in non-
representative agency cases in conformity with Anglo-American
rather than civilian rules. In the Sentell case, Chief Justice O'Niell
reaches the same result by a different technique; he denies that rep-
resentation is essential to mandate. In so saying, he makes our term
"mandate" the equivalent of the term "agency" in contract matters
at common law.
APPRAISAL
Would it have been more advantageous for the supreme court
to have adopted the French or civilian theory that direct litigation
between undisclosed principal and third party be forbidden? Prac-
tical demands of present-daylife weigh heavily in favor of the result
achieved by our courts. First, there is the matter of convenience in
following the law of those jurisdictions to which Louisiana is so
closely bound by commercial ties. An even more cogent reason is
the important effect of holding the undisclosed principal liable as
an added stimulus to the functioning of our complicated business
machinery. There is a very definite tendency in the entire field of
law to place the burden of financial responsibility on the solvent
party. That person would certainly be the undisclosed principal in
the majority of cases. The contract made by the agent is really cre-
ated for the benefit of the undisclosed principal, and to hold him
liable for the performance of its terms would seem to contravene
none of the principles of natural justice. And, in turn, to make the
third party directly responsible to the undisclosed principal for
breach of the contract would generally work no hardship upon that
third party since, in any case, he would be liable to the agent.
24. Orleans No. 7279.
25. De Soto Building Co., Ltd. v. Kohnstamm, Orleans No. 7627.
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Concluding, then, that the result reached in these non-repre-
sentative agency cases has been satisfactory, what of the techniques
employed to achieve these ends? Is it doctrinally proper to assume
that mandate includes non-representative agency even though there
is no provision in our written law to that effect? The better course
would seem to be a recognition by our supreme court that Louisiana
jurisprudence, through a line of consistent decisions, created a set of
rules, analogous to those governing "simple agency," to be applied
to a situation not provided for in our written law.
FRED W. JONES
LOUISIANA JUVENILE COURTS -APPEALS
In the absence of special constitutional or statutory provisions
to the contrary and except for equity proceedings, judicial review
in 'common law states does not include questions of fact, but is gen-
erally limited to the correction of errors of law.' Thus, the distinc-
tion made in Louisiana between appeal on questions of law in crim-
inal cases and appeal on questions of both law and fact in civil cases'
is peculiar to this state. Limiting review generally to questions of
law is predicated upon the philosophy that the jury should be a final
judge on issues of fact and is further bolstered by the practical con-
sideration that a review of the facts would burden the appellate
court with an examination and appraisal of all testimony adduced
upon the trial of the case. Juvenile court cases, however, are not
heard by juries and are not conducted with the formalities of a reg-
ular criminal or civil trial. As the Louisiana Supreme Court so aptly
stated in the recent case of In re Diaz, "Such cases are not to be
classed as civil or criminal-indeed they are sui generis."3 It is appro-
priate then that the scope of appeal from juvenile court judgments
be considered in the light of the nature of those proceedings with
balancing of the practical and policy considerations involved.
Two separate and distinct rules are presently employed in
Louisiana for appeal from juvenile courts. The Louisiana Constitu-
tion4 provides for appeal from the juvenile court in the Parish of
Orleans to the Louisiana Supreme Court on questions of law and
1. 5 C. J. S. 550, n. 92, § 1642.
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
3. 31 So. (2d) 195, 196 (La. 1947).
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 96, as amended by La. Act 322 of 1944.
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